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Abstract. This paper argues that the effectiveness of fiscal policy may increase markedly
during periods of low nominal interest rates and high, persistent, unemployment. An
increase in government spending boosts economic activity and reduces the unemployment
rate both in the present and in the future. As a less disconcerting future spurs a rise
in private consumption, unemployment falls even further and triggers an additional rise
in private demand, and so on. In a stylized model, I show that the marginal impact of
government spending on output is equal to the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. In a more realistic framework, the effect is somewhat attenuated and displays
significant nonlinearities with respect to the depth of the crisis as well as the size of the
stimulus package. But in a severe recession with an unemployment rate of eight percent
or above, the fiscal multiplier is equal to 1.5.
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1. Introduction
The recent financial crisis plunged the world economy into a deep recession with stagnat-
ing growth and soaring, persistent, unemployment rates. Despite aggressive actions under-
taken by monetary authorities, demand remained stubbornly weak. With unprecedented
low levels of short term interest, policy makers were compelled to reach for alternative
stabilization tools, including expansionary fiscal policy. The effectiveness of fiscal policy,
however, remains highly controversial and its study is plagued by numerous theoretical
challenges which are still vividly discussed amongst professional- and academic economists.
This paper aims to address some of the most pressing concerns by providing a novel answer
to a, by now, classic question: What is the size of the fiscal multiplier?1
I show that the potency of fiscal policy can be strikingly large during periods of low
nominal interest rates and high, persistent, unemployment. The argument relies on two
separate but reinforcing mechanisms. First, in a liquidity trap, output is largely determined
by demand. If households wish to consume more, firms will also produce more. Second,
the labor market is inertial. As a consequence, any change in current unemployment is
likely to persist into the future. Together these two mechanisms imply that an increase in
government spending raises output and lowers the unemployment rate both in the present
and in the future. But as rational economic actors desire to smooth consumption over
time, the increase in future output feeds back to a further rise in current demand, and
so on. This interplay between present- and future economic activity has the capacity to
propagate the effectiveness of demand-stimulating policies many time over, and the fiscal
multiplier exceeds unity under a wide range of circumstances.2
But a tale of recovery is also a tale of a slump. Confronted with disappointing news
concerning future income, households wish to save resources in order to insulate themselves
from the dire times ahead. If news are sufficiently ominous, the nominal interest rate falls
to zero and brings the economy into a liquidity trap. Savings materialize as cash hoardings
which drain economy of liquidity. With downwardly rigid money-wages the associated
shortfall in nominal demand may have real consequences, and provokes a marked decline in
current economic activity. This is the old news.
With rising, and persistent, unemployment, however, the future now appears even bleaker.
Additional measures to smooth consumption only amplifies the initial decline in economic
1Througout this paper, ‘the fiscal multiplier’ refers to the marginal change in output in response to a
marginal change in contemporaneous, and wasteful, government purchases. I therefore abstract from possible
cumulative effects on output, anticipation effects of future policy on current aggregates, and productive
government investments.
2Of course, as Ricardian equivalence holds (Barro, 1974), ‘the balanced budget multiplier’ (Haavelmo,
1945) exceeds unity as well.
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activity, raises unemployment, and further depresses the economic outlook. I show that this
downward spiral of self-reinforcing thrift can have an abysmal effects on economic activity
even in the absence of any real shocks to contemporaneous productivity.
But the government can turn a vicious circle around. By borrowing – or taxing – unuti-
lized cash and spending it, unemployment falls and the future appears less disconcerting.The
downward spiral of self-reinforcing thrift is deflected into a virtuous in which spending begets
spending. In a stylized model, I show that the marginal impact of government purchases
on output equals the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, or simply the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. In a more realistic framework, the effect is somewhat
attenuated and displays significant nonlinearities with respect to the depth of the crisis as
well as the size of the stimulus package. But in a severe recession with unemployment ex-
ceeding the natural rate with three percentage points or more, the fiscal multiplier is equal
to 1.5.
Some may argue that the above scenario yields few further insights than those tradition-
ally associated with Keynes (1936). That would be a mistake. The Keynesian narrative
hinges on the presumption of myopic consumers which, once replaced by forward looking
behavior, attenuates the multiplier not to exceed unity (see for instance Krugman (1998)).3
Indeed, the fundamental propagation mechanism explored in this paper – the interplay
between current- and future economic activity – is not an outcome in despite of rational
expectations, but rather a result by cause of of rational expectations. For better and worse,
forward looking consumers brings the future to the present, and vice versa.
With respect to the previous literature, there has been no shortage of papers exploring
the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Since the seminal works by Hall (1980), Barro (1981),
and Barro and King (1984) the mechanisms within the standard flexible-price neoclassical
framework are well understood. An increase in government spending reduces private wealth,
and thus stimulates labor supply. Real wages fall in response to clear the labor market,
but the net effect on output is unambiguously positive. Contrary to the empirical evidence,
however, the same wealth-effect which instills a rise in output depresses private demand
and, in marked contrast to this paper, suggest a negative response in consumption.4
Confronted with these anomalies, researchers have instead turned attention towards new-
Keynesian flavored models with sticky prices. When monopolistic firms are unable to reset
3Or at least, this used to be true. Bilbiie (2009) shows that in an otherwise straight-shooting neoclassical
model the multiplier may exceed one if consumption is an inferior good. See Monacelli and Perotti (2008)
for a further discussion of the impact of preferences on fiscal policy.
4Admittedly, the empirical literature is not conclusive on this point. Fatas and Mihov (2001), Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), Gal´ı et al. (2007), Perotti (2008), Fisher and Peters (2009) find empirical support of a
positive response in consumption. But studies such as Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Ramey (2011) do not.
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prices at their own discretion, markups – or, in many cases, simply the reciprocal of real
wages – turn countercyclical. Thus, as expansionary fiscal policy enhances labor supply,
real wages increase instead of decrease, and cushion the aforementioned fall in private
consumption. Regrettably, however, the associated response in monetary policy may well
mitigate much of the first-order effects, and the fiscal multiplier remains below unity under
a wide range of circumstances.5
Those circumstances do not extend, however, to a situation of a liquidity trap. In recent,
and highly influential work, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) and Eggertsson
(2010) analyze the effectiveness of fiscal policy at the ‘zero lower bound’.6 With nominal
rates stuck at zero, staggered pricing causes a deflationary spiral which raises the real inter-
est rate, stimulates savings, and thus exacerbates any initial decline in economic activity.
In similarity to this paper, fiscal policy has the capacity to turn a vicious circle around.
An increase in both current and future public outlays sets the economy on an inflationary
path in which spending begets spending. The fiscal multiplier, they show, can be sizable
and easily exceed one.
This story is quite different from mine. Christiano et al. (2011) and Eggertsson (2010)
primarily analyze a situation with multiple liquidity spells and with repeated fiscal action.
I consider a liquidity trap which lasts for one period with an associated one-shot increase
in government purchases. The difference is subtle, but the consequences important. Absent
repeated liquidity spells, the aforementioned deflationary spiral vanishes, and the potency
of fiscal policy is reduced. Letting the duration of the liquidity crisis approach one atten-
uates the multiplier in Eggertsson (2010) to unity, and Christiano et al. (2011) to 1.3.7
It is therefore neither the presence of a liquidity trap nor the increase in contemporane-
ous spending per se which renders a large fiscal multiplier. Rather, it is the combination
between a deep and prolonged recession with a long lasting, committed, fiscal expansion
that provides a fertile ground for effective public spending. Although a very appealing and
relevant scenario, these ideas contrast markedly to this study in which purely temporary
fiscal policy may be highly effective even in a brief, albeit deep, downturn.
Apart from these diverging views, there are also some pronounced differences in the
mechanics underpinning the results. I consider a frictional labor market with rigid nominal
5See for instance, Gal´ı et al. (2007), Monacelli and Perotti (2008), and Woodford (2011) for a detailed
discussion.
6See Christiano (2004), Braun and Waki (2010), Erceg and Linde´ (2010), Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and
Wieland (2010), and Taisuke (2012) for further studies on this topic.
7In this situation the real interest rate is constant and a unit multiplier follows straightforwardly from
the analysis of Woodford (2011). A multiplier of 1.3 in Christiano et al. (2011) follows from non-separable
preferences in consumption and leisure as illustrated in Bilbiie (2009), and Monacelli and Perotti (2008).
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wages. As a consequence, the main thrust in this paper is governed by labor demand, and
not by supply. An increase in government spending puts upward pressure on current prices,
reduces real wages, and encourages hiring. The reciprocal of real wages are therefore pro-
cyclical with respect to variations in demand, but turn countercyclical in face of shocks to
labor productivity.8
But ideas are also shared. In similarity to this paper, Eggertsson (2010) and Christiano
et al. (2011) acknowledge the importance of an intertemporal feedback mechanism which
is capable of propagating the effectiveness of demand-stimulating policies many times over.
In their studies, this feedback stems from the inflationary/deflationary spiral associated
with the prolonged nature of the recession, and with the positive ‘news’ associated with
sustained fiscal actions.9 In this paper, the feedback mechanism rather relies on the inherent
sluggishness observed in frictional labor markets, which tightly interlinks current economic
activity to the future, and vice versa. Needless to say, this paper builds upon, and I believe
complements, the works of Eggertsson and Christiano et al.
Empirical estimates of the fiscal multiplier are dispersed. In a recent survey, Ramey
(2011) concludes that an increase in government purchases stimulates the economy with a
multiplier between 0.8 and 1.5. Hall (2009), on the other hand, suggests a slightly smaller
range of 0.7 to 1.0.10 But the disparity in estimates also underlines a widely acknowledged
fact: There exist no single fiscal multiplier. Rather, the effectiveness of fiscal policy varies
crucially with the state of the economy, and estimates diverge depending on the choice of
sample period and identification methods (see Parker (2011) for a discussion).
Barro and Redlick (2011), for instance, find a multiplier of 0.7. But when they allow for
interactions with the unemployment rate, the multiplier rises to unity.11 Gordon and Krenn
(2011) confine attention to the defense build-up associated with World War II. They argue
that past estimates are attenuated by capacity constraints during the later stages of the
war, as well as outright prohibitions on the production of civilian goods. By cutting their
sample at the second-, instead of the fourth quarter, of 1941, they avoid such concerns and
the estimated multiplier increases from 0.9 to 2.5.Recent evidence from cross-state studies
further corroborates these findings. Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) and Shoag (2010) show
8Although this is not a study of business cycle properties, recent research by Hall (2009) and Nekarda
and Ramey (2010) lend empirical support to this view.
9Indeed, Woodford (2011) notes that “Eggertsson (2010) obtains a multiplier of 2.3, 1.0 of this is due to
the increase in government purchases during the current quarter, while the other 1.3 is the effect of higher
anticipated government purchases in the future”. An analogous argument applies to Christiano et al.
10Ramey (2011) adds the savings clause that “[r]easonable people can argue, however, that the data do
not reject 0.5 or 2” (p. 673), and Hall (2009) argues that “higher values are not ruled out” (p. 183).
11Assuming an unemployment rate of 12 percent.
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that estimates of the multiplier may nearly double in periods in which the unemployment
rate exceeds the sample mean. And using a structural VAR based approach, Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2011; forthcoming) show that the multiplier is only moderate, or even
negative, in expansions, while it exceeds two in periods of recessions.
The framework analyzed in this paper is consistent with these observations. During a
deep downturn in which the unemployment rate exceeds the natural by two percentage
points or more, the multiplier exceeds unity, and plateaus at 1.5. Private consumption
rise in response to an increase in government spending, and fiscal policy unambiguously
improves welfare. Interestingly, however, as the stimulus package expands and closes much
of the output-gap – arguably a relevant scenario in the war-years of 1940-1945 – both the
marginal and the average multiplier fall well below one. Indeed, the average multiplier
associated with a deep recession, but in which fiscal spending has successfully closed most
of the output-gap, equals 0.75, a number markedly in line with the estimates provided in
Barro (1981). During less distressing times, however, the multiplier falls short of unity
even at modest levels of spending, and public outlays unambiguously crowds-out private
consumption. In ‘normal’ times the multiplier is zero.
2. Model
The economy is populated by a government, a large number of potential firms, and a
unit measure of workers. The planning horizon is infinite, and time is discrete. There are
two types of commodities in the economy. Cash, mt, which is storable, but not edible. And
output, yt, which is edible, but not storable. Cash assumes the role of the numeraire, and
output trades at relative price pt. In order to abstract from any potential effects of monetary
policy, I assume that cash is in fixed supply, such that mt = m for all time periods, t. The
output good, however, is repeatedly produced in each period using labor, nt, and labor
productivity, zt, as the sole factors of production. The precise nature of technology will be
specified and discussed in the subsequent sections. There is no physical capital, nor any
investments.
2.1. Households. Household initiate their lives in period zero. They supply labor inelas-
tically and the time-endowment is normalized to one, ℓt = 1. Employment is denoted nt,
and the unemployment rate is therefore given by the difference in labor supplied and labor
demanded, ut = 1− nt.
The wage-rate in the economy is denoted w˜t. Total income (or simply income) consti-
tutes both total labor income, ntw˜t, as well as firm profits (if any), πt, and is denoted wt.
There are complete insurance markets across households, so each household earns income
wt irrespective of whether she is employed or not. Income is received by the very end of a
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period – i.e. after any consumption decisions – and is therefore de facto first disposable in
the ensuing period.
A representative household enters period t with assets bt, paying net return it. Assets
are thought of as one-period nominally riskless bonds. The household pays lump-sum taxes
Tt ≥ 0, and may spend the remaining resources on consumption, ptct, or on purchases of
new assets, bt+1.
12 The sequence of budget constraints is given by
bt(1 + it) + wt−1 − Tt = ptct + bt+1, t = 0, 1, . . . (1)
with the associated no-Ponzi condition
lim
t→∞
bt+1/pt+1
Πtn=0(1 + in+1)pn/pn+1
≥ 0 (2)
Given a process of taxes and prices, {Tt, pt, it}
∞
t=0, the household decides on feasible
consumption and asset plans, {ct, bt+1}
∞
t=0, to maximize her expected net present value
utility
V ({ct}
∞
t=0) = E
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct) (3)
For the time being, I will remain agnostic with respect to the stochastic processes underlying
the economy, and simply let E denote the (mathematical) expectations operator conditional
on period zero information. The momentary utility function u(·) is assumed to be once
continuously differentiable with limc→0 u
′(c) = ∞, − cu
′′(c)
u′(c) = σ > 1 ∀c ∈ R+, and β ∈
(0, 1).13 The parameter σ is commonly known as the coefficient of relative risk aversion,
and its reciprocal represents the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
In addition to equations (1) and (2), any optimal and feasible plan must observe the
Euler equation
u′(ct) = βEt[(1 + it+1)
pt
pt+1
u′(ct+1)] (4)
as well as the transversality condition
lim
n→∞
Etβ
nu′(ct+n)
bt+n+1
pt+n
≤ 0 (5)
where Et denotes the expectations operator conditional on period t information.
12As labor supply is entirely inelastic, lump-sum taxes are isomorphic to income taxes, and the distinction
is meaningless from a substantive point of view.
13Following the seminal work of Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964), the only class of utility functions satis-
fying the above assumptions is given by; u(c) = c
1−σ−1
1−σ
, with σ > 1.
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2.2. Government. Apart from lump-sum taxes, Tt, the government has access to two
additional policy tools; government spending, Gt, and public debt, dt. For the ease of
exposition, they are all denominated in terms of the numeraire. A process of taxes, spending,
and debt, {Tt, Gt, dt}
∞
t=0, is feasible if it satisfies the sequence of budget constraints
Tt + dt+1 = Gt + (1 + it)dt, t = 0, 1, . . . (6)
as well as the no-Ponzi condition
lim
t→∞
dt+1/pt+1
Πtn=0(1 + in+1)pn/pn+1
≤ 0 (7)
As a consequence, whenever constraint (7) holds with equality, the net present value of real
government spending equals the net present value of taxes.
Lastly, the sum of the government’s and the private sector’s initial nominal disposable
resources must sum to m. That is
(b0 − d0)(1 + i0) + w−1 = m
2.3. The equation of exchange. Combining the households’ and the government’s bud-
get constraints yields
(bt − dt)(1 + it) + wt−1 = ptct +Gt + (bt+1 − dt+1)
Define St as aggregate savings; i.e. St = bt − dt. An equilibrium in the bond market infers
that St ≥ 0, it ≥ 0, and St × it = 0. That is, either aggregate savings are zero, and the
interest rate may be positive, or aggregate savings are positive, and the interest-rate must
be zero.14 Thus, whenever aggregate savings exceeds zero, cash is hoarded.
The national income identity is given by ptyt = ptct + Gt, and aggregate allocations
therefore observe
St(1 + it) + wt−1 = ptyt + St+1 (8)
By definition, S0(1 + i0) + w−1 equals initial aggregate nominal disposable resources, m.
As a consequence, if the interest rate in period one is positive, S1 must equal zero, and
disposable income in period one, w0, is equal to nominal spending in period zero, p0y0. By
construction p0y0 is equal to m. On the other hand, if S1 is strictly positive, the interest
rate must be zero and S1(1+ i1)+w0 = S1+p0y0 = m. Thus, St(1+ it)+wt−1 = m implies
that St+1(1 + it+1) + wt = m, and by construction, S0(1 + i0) + w−1 = m.
An equilibrium in the bond market therefore infers
m = ptyt + St+1, t = 0, 1, . . .
14As agents are permitted to freely borrow and lend at the market interest rate, it, a negative rate of
interest yields infinite arbitrage possibilities which are ruled out by the zero lower bound, it ≥ 0.
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or, by defining the velocity of money as vt =
m−St+1
m ,
mvt = ptyt, t = 0, 1, . . . (9)
Equation (9) is commonly known as the equation of exchange, and it relates the supply
money and its velocity to the nominal level of output (Fisher, 1911).
While much of the supply side of the economy is yet to be specified, the equation of
exchange contains some important intuition with respect to later results. Suppose that ag-
gregate savings suddenly would rise and exceed zero. The velocity of money then declines
and the economy is drained of liquidity. If prices, pt, are downwardly rigid, such a shortfall
of velocity will lead to a fall in real economic activity, yt, and potentially to rising unem-
ployment. As argued in the introduction, a persistent rise in unemployment may feed back
to a further increase in savings, as households wish to shield themselves from the dire times
ahead. Thus, an initial increase in savings may provoke a decline in economic activity, a
rise in the unemployment rate, which in turn sparks a further rise in savings, and so on.
However, the government may turn a vicious circle around. When St+1 = bt+1 − dt+1
strictly exceeds zero, equation (9) provides some prima facie reasons as to why an increase
in government debt – accompanied by an increase in government expenditures – may reduce
aggregate savings; increase the velocity of money; and ultimately put upward pressure on
economic activity. Indeed, together with the amplifying mechanism underpinning the labor
market, these ideas summarize the main argument put forward in this article which will be
formally explored in the subsequent sections.
As a final remark, it should be noted that the equation of exchange – together with the
households budget constraint (1)-(2), and the Euler equation (4) – reveals that Ricardian
Equivalance holds (Barro, 1974). For instance, given a certain level of spending Gt, an
increase in lump-sum taxes, Tt, followed by a decrease in government debt, dt+1, can easily
be parried by an identical decrease in private savings, bt+1, leaving both aggregate sav-
ings, St+1, and the path of consumption entirely unaltered. As a consequence, inasmuch
as a debt fueled increase in government spending may reverse a vicious circle, so may a
contemporaneously tax financed expansion.
It is important to notice that most, if not all, of the above propagating effects are initiated
by a sharp increase in aggregate savings, St+1. As excess savings must take the form of cash
hoarding at a zero rate of interest, the economy is in a liquidity trap (Eggertsson, 2008).
Definition 1. The economy is in a liquidity trap in period t, if and only if St+1 > 0.
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3. Analytic Framework
This section provides a simple analytical illustration of the main mechanism developed in
this paper. To this end, I consider firms which operate a constant returns to scale technol-
ogy, absent any costs of recruitment. Inertia, or frictions, in the labor market exist but are
imposed rather than derived, and the evolution of unemployment follows an exogenously
specified law of motion. Despite these limitations, the resulting framework generates sev-
eral important insights which are valid under a wide range of circumstances. Section 4
will consider an environment in which the persistence of unemployment is endogenously
determined. The associated complications, however, calls for a numerical solution method
which, of course, somewhat clouds the analysis. Nonetheless, the main results developed
here remain qualitatively, and to a large extent also quantitatively, unaffected.
Firms produce the output good using labor, nt, and labor productivity, zt, according to
the technology
yt = ztnt
As a consequence, the hiring decision of a price-taking and profit-maximizing firm observes
ptzt = w˜t (10)
where, as previously, w˜t denotes the wage rate in period t. Constant returns to scale implies
that both the number of firms, as well as the measure of hired workers, are undetermined.
That is, as long as prices, pt, productivity, zt, and wages, w˜t, satisfy the first order condition
in equation (10), an arbitrary number of firms are willing to hire all, nt = 1, none, nt = 0,
or some, nt ∈ (0, 1), of the workers in the economy.
The definition of a competitive steady-state equilibrium is standard and therefore omit-
ted. The following proposition states that such an equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proposition 1. Suppose that zt = z > 0 and Gt/pt = gˆ, with gˆ < z, for t = 0, 1, . . .
Then there exist a unique competitive equilibrium with prices pt = m/z, w˜t = m and
it+1 = 1/β − 1.
Proof. In Appendix A. 
Proposition 1 reveals two important features of the economy. First, as money supply
is constant there exist a unique steady-state equilibrium. This is a well-known result and
hinges on the fixed supply of the numeraire, m, and the inability of both the private and the
public sector to endogenously create money (Sargent and Wallace, 1975; Benhabib et al.,
2001). Second, the equilibrium is uniquely determined under any process of taxes, Tt, and
public debt, dt, as long as these satisfy the government’s budget constraint, (6), and the
no-Ponzi condition, (7). This, of course, is yet another reflection of Ricardian equivalence.
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3.1. Experiment. In order to understand to what extent fiscal policy may alleviate the
adverse effects of a negative demand shock, I will consider the following simple experiment.
In period t = −1 the economy is initially at the steady state equilibrium. In period zero,
however, agents unexpectedly receive news that labor productivity in period one will decline
and equal δ < z. With regard to the future process of shocks I will continue to remain
somewhat equivocal. The process of future shocks is merely assumed to be such that the
economy is not in a liquidity trap in period one.
Assumption 1. The future process of shocks is such that St+1 = 0, for t = 1.
There is a wide range of processes which naturally satisfy the above assumption. If, for
instance, labor productivity, zt, reverts back to its steady-state value in period two onwards,
aggregate savings are zero in each period on the continuation path, including period one.15
In a two-period setting, S2 = 0 corresponds to a finite horizon end-condition, and is therefore
trivially satisfied. However, there are also reasons to believe that period-one savings may
equal zero for a much larger class of processes, and Assumption 1 may therefore be seen
as a more prudent restriction than a particular choice of the evolution of events. Liquidity
traps are, after all, quite rare affairs.
While it appears obvious that a decline in future labor productivity may engender a fall
in the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, it is less obvious that such a decrease
may have a real effect on current economic allocations. For instance, a ceteris paribus fall in
the nominal interest rate may well offset a decline in intertemporal substitutability, leaving
all optimality conditions intact at unaltered (real and nominal) allocations. If the fall in
productivity is large enough for the interest rate to drop to zero, however, intratemporal
prices – and possibly also quantities – are left as the only relevant margins of adjustment.
Yet, the equation of exchange in (9) accompanied by Assumption 1 reveals that p1 = m/y1,
which closely ties together prices in period one with demanded quantities. In addition,
Assumption 2 ensures that nominal wages are downwardly rigid, putting further structure
on the possible movements of prices.
Assumption 2. Nominal wages in period zero are downwardly rigid; w˜0 ≥ m.
That is, nominal wages in the presence of a news shock cannot fall short of those in its
absence.16 It is straightforward to see that a profit-maximizing firm’s first order condition
15See the proof of Proposition 1, Appendix A.
16Recall that the steady-state wage rate is given by m. Barattieri et al. (2010) and Bewley (1999) provide
empirical support in favor of downward nominal wage rigidities.
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– equation (10) – infers that p0 ≥ m/z, and that rigid nominal wages therefore infer rigid
nominal prices.17
With respect to the labor market, unemployment is assumed to be persistent. More
specifically, employment evolves according to an exogenously imposed law of motion, in-
tended to parsimoniously capture the idea of a frictional labor market.
Assumption 3. Employment evolves according to nt+1 = h(nt), with h
′(nt)nt/h(nt) = α
for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and h(1) = 1.
The elasticity α governs the degree of frictions in the labor market.18If α equals zero, the
labor market collapses to a Walrasian spot-market, and there is no persistence in unem-
ployment. If α, however, is equal to one, there are ‘infinite’ frictions, and unemployment
displays hysteresis. For any value of α in between these extremes, employment follows a
mean-reverting process and eventually returns to its steady-state value absent any further
disturbances.
Lastly, apart from period zero, real government spending is treated as a given, exoge-
nous, process denoted gt = Gt/pt, t = 1, 2, . . . Expenditures in period zero, however, are
instead comprised by two distinct parts; a non-discretionary component, denoted g0, and a
discretionary component, simply denoted g. The objective is to understand to which extent
changes in real discretionary spending, g, translates to changes in real contemporaneous
output, y0.
For simplicity, all equilibrium outcomes will be evaluated at a spending level which is
equal to a constant fraction of output; i.e. gt = γ × yt, where γ ≥ 0 denotes the spending-
to-output ratio. Non-discretionary spending therefore takes on a fixed hypothetical value, gt,
which merely happens to coincide with the fraction, γ, of output. Obviously, in the absence
of such a view, discretionary spending may causally affect non-discretionary spending, and
therefore yield misleading results.
3.2. Results. Under the hypothesis that discretionary spending equals zero, the assump-
tions stipulated above imply the following equilibrium conditions
u′(y0) = β(1 + i1)p0
y1
m
u′(y1) (11)
y1
z
≤ (1 + i1)p0
y1
m
(12)
n1 = δh(n0) (13)
17It should however be noted that this is not longer true in the richer framework developed in Section 4.
18This law of motion is not taken out of thin air. See Section 4.5 on page 21 for a discussion of how this
functional form relates to a log-linear approximation of a more familiar evolution of employment.
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where the first line merely restates the Euler equation under the premise that p1 = m/y1.
19
The second equation follows from Assumption 2 together with the zero lower bound, and
the third from the imposed law of motion for employment. In addition, an equilibrium in
goods and bond markets observes
m = p0y0 + S1 (14)
i1 ≥ 0, and S1 ≥ 0 (15)
i1 × S1 = 0 (16)
Define δ∗ as the lowest possible productivity level in period one which does not put the
economy in a liquidity trap.20 That is
u′(z) =
β
z
δ∗u′(δ∗) (17)
With constant relative risk-aversion, δ∗ is given by zβ
1
σ−1 , which is strictly less than z.
Proposition 2. If δ ≥ δ∗ there exist a unique equilibrium with y0 = z, y1 = δ, and
p0 = m/z, and the fiscal multiplier is zero.
Proof. In Appendix A. 
Together with Proposition 2 above, the equation of exchange reveals that whenever δ ≥
δ∗, S1 = 0 and the economy is not in a liquidity trap. Output in both period zero and one
are equal to their potential values, z and δ, respectively, and the fiscal multiplier is zero.
Proposition 3. If δ < δ∗ there exist a unique equilibrium such that
y0 = z
(
δ
δ∗
) σ−1
σ−α(σ−1)
< z, y1 = δh(y0/z) < δ, and p0 = m/z (18)
Proof. In Appendix A. 
Again, the equation of exchange infers that S1 > 0, and for any δ < δ
∗ the economy is
therefore driven into a liquidity trap. Proposition 3 suggests that under these circumstances,
output in both period zero as well as period one fall well below their potential values, z
and δ, respectively. The reason is that a sufficiently severe fall in future labor productivity
triggers a spur in savings which drives the nominal interest rate to zero. At zero interest,
excess savings takes the form of cash hoardings which drains the economy of liquidity. As
wages, and ultimately prices, are downwardly rigid, a fall in nominal demand yields lower
output and rising unemployment. When the unemployment rate is persistent, the future
19As real government spending is equal to γyt, consumption equals yt(1 − γ), with the latter the factor
canceling out in the Euler equation.
20Propositions 2 and 3 verifies this interpretation of δ∗.
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appears even bleaker, provoking a further rise in savings, weaker demand, and a larger rise
in the unemployment rate, and so on.
Proposition 3 suggests that this intertemporal propagation mechanism can be profoundly
compromising with respect to period-zero output. When the labor market displays hystere-
sis and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution approaches zero, the economy shuts
down and the unemployment rate soars to 100 percent. Admittedly, of course, this rather
draconian scenario hinges on quite unrealistic parameter values, and should not be taken
literally.
Other features of Proposition 3 may come less as a surprise. Output tend to be lower the
larger the decline in labor productivity, δ, as more disappointing news translate into larger
savings; a steeper fall in both liquidity and economic activity; and ultimately a larger rise
in the unemployment rate. In addition, a more persistent rise in unemployment – i.e. an
α closer to unity – is associated with a larger decline in output, and a more pronounced
rise in the unemployment rate. Clearly, a more persistent rise in unemployment yields an
even more distressing outlook for the future, which in turn exasperates the private sector’s
willingness to save further.
3.2.1. Fiscal Policy. So to what extent may fiscal policy backtrack the downward spiral
illustrated above? By borrowing – or taxing – unutilized cash and spending it, the govern-
ment may turn a vicious circle around. The associated increase in aggregate demand raises
output, lowers unemployment, and instigates a brighter future. As a consequence, private
savings fall, consumption rises, and the unemployment rate decreases further. Of course, in
as much as an arbitrarily small elasticity of intertemporal substitution may have an abysmal
effect on period-zero output in the wake of a liquidity trap, government spending may have
an equally powerful impact in the opposite direction.
As previously, let gt denote real government purchases, gt = Gt/pt. Under the hypotheses
laid out in Proposition 3, the equilibrium conditions in (11)-(16) can be summarized by the
Euler equation
u′(y0 − g0 − g) =
β
z
y1u
′(y1 − g1) (19)
with y1 = δn1, n1 = h(n0), and where g ≥ 0 denotes the discretionary part of government
purchases. I pay no attention to whether an increase in spending is debt- or tax financed,
as this is inconsequential.
Proposition 4 summarizes the main result of this section.
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Proposition 4. Under the hypotheses laid out in Proposition 3, the fiscal multiplier is given
by
∂y0
∂g
=
1
1− α
(
1− 1σˆ
) , with σˆ = σ
1− γ
Proof. In Appendix A. 
To get an intuitive grasp of Proposition 4 and how government spending trickles through
the economy, it is illustrative to decompose the total effect on output into several successive
rounds. For the moment let me ignore the case in which the output-to-spending ratio, γ is
positive, such that g0 = g1 = 0.
First of all, as the aggregate supply relation – the firms’ first order condition in (10)
– is horizontal, a marginal increase in government spending translates to an immediate
one-to-one response in output. That one is easy.
Second, however, an increase in contemporaneous output lowers unemployment both in
the present and in the future, which in turn raises current output further, and so on. Thus,
to understand the impact of any successive rounds beyond the immediate, it is imperative
to understand how changes in current output translates to changes in future output, and
vice versa.
Employment evolves according to n1 = h(n0). If period-zero output equals y0, employ-
ment is straightforwardly given by y0/z. And as period-one output is given by δn1, it follows
that y1 = δh(y0/z). Thus, the elasticity of future output with respect to current output is
given by α.
To find the reverse effect – i.e. the elasticity of current output with respect to future
output – implicit differentiation of the Euler equation in (19) reveals that
∂ ln y0
∂ ln y1
= 1− 1/σ (20)
The reason is straightforward. Following the Euler equation, a unit percentage increase
in future consumption yields a ceteris paribus one-to-one percentage increase in current
consumption. Regrettably, this is not a ceteris paribus world. An increase in future output
is deflationary, and the associated substitution effect offsets the initial response by the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1/σ.21 The total net effect is therefore 1− 1/σ.
Combining the these two elasticities reveals a striking relation
∂y1
∂y0
×
∂y0
∂y1
= α
(
1−
1
σ
)
(21)
21Following the equation of exchange, inflation is simply “too much money chasing too few goods”, and
an increase in output reduces prices.
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That is, a marginal increase in current output propagates by way of a persistent labor market
and a brighter future to a further marginal increase of α(1 − 1/σ). As a consequence, an
increase in government spending carries a first round impact on output of one, a second
round impact of α(1−1/σ), a third round of (α(1−1/σ))2 , and so on. The fiscal multiplier
is given by the sum of the successive rounds. That is
∂y0
∂g
= 1 + α
(
1−
1
σ
)
+
(
α
(
1−
1
σ
))2
+ . . . =
1
1− α
(
1− 1σ
)
which replicates the result in Proposition 4 with γ set to zero.
Consider the case in which there are no labor market frictions, i.e. α = 0. Proposition
4 then reveals that under this hypothesis the fiscal multiplier is equal to unity. This result
corroborates the findings of Krugman (1998), Eggertsson (2010), and Christiano et al.
(2011), and suggests that it is not the presence of a liquidity trap per se which is the main
driving force behind a potentially large multiplier.22
In the polar-, but arguably more realistic, scenario in which unemployment displays
hysteresis, α is equal to one, and the fiscal multiplier is instead given by the parameter
σ; the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.23 While estimates of either
σ or its reciprocal are both unreliable and controversial, I believe few economists would
outrightly reject an elasticity of around one-half or smaller. From this perspective, labor
market frictions appear incredibly important for the effectiveness of fiscal policy.
Lastly, for any intermediate case, i.e. α ∈ (0, 1), the multiplier varies but always exceeds
unity. As the elasticity of intertemporal substitution approaches zero, the multiplier peaks
at 1/(1 − α).
The above discussion intentionally abstract from the possibly amplifying effects of non-
discretionary spending, gt. Proposition 4, however, reveals that the mere size of the public
sector, γ, may indeed be of importance. The reason is straightforward. One of the key
components of the fiscal multiplier is given by the elasticity of current output with respect
to future output. In the absence of non-discretionary spending, this elasticity is, quite
22Christiano et al. (2011) and Eggertsson (2010) study the effects of multiple liquidity spells with asso-
ciated multiple spending shocks. To make results comparable, I set µ and σ in equation (32) in Christiano
et al. (2011), to zero and one respectively, and the parameter ρ in Eggertsson (2010) to zero. Under these
circumstances – i.e. a one-time liquidity- and spending shock in the absence of complementarities between
consumption and leisure – the fiscal multiplier equals one.
23How relevant is this scenario? Using monthly data on unemployment in the United States (BLS series
UNRATE) from 1980-2011, I regress ln(nt/n¯) on a constant and on its own lagged value, where n¯ refers to
the sample mean. This yields estimates −0.0001 and 0.9967, respectively, with R2 = 0.99. An augmented
Dickey-Fuller test cannot reject the unit-root ln(nt+1) = ln(nt) + ut, against a multitude of stationary
specifications. Thus the function h(nt) = n
α
t with α close or equal to one appears to provide a reasonable
approximation to what can be observed in the data.
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intuitively, given by 1− 1/σ. However, as the fiscal multiplier is related to how output, and
not consumption, responds to government spending, the relevant measure of intertemporal
substitution is given by
−
∂ ln(yt+1/yt)
∂ ln(u′(ct+1)/u′(ct))
=
1− γ
σ
=
1
σˆ
As a consequence, in the presence of non-discretionary spending, the elasticity of current
output with respect to future output equals 1 − 1/σˆ, which thus further intensifies the
potency of discretionary fiscal policy.
But why does non-discretionary spending abate intertemporal substitution? As private
consumption is given by c = y − g, a percentage increase in output yields a 1/(1 − γ)
percentage increase in consumption, and the aforementioned intertemporal propagation
mechanism is magnified to the same extent.
Lastly, there are two additional implications that deserves to be mentioned. First, the
response in private consumption with respect to a marginal increase in discretionary public
spending is quite trivially given by the fiscal multiplier less one. Since σ is assumed to be
greater than unity, the ‘consumption multiplier’ is strictly positive, and fiscal stimulus is,
at least on the margin, unambiguously welfare improving for all α > 0. Second, the tax
multiplier is zero. This follows from Ricardian equivalence.
4. Endogenous Persistence
The objective of this section is to dispense with Assumption 3, and evaluate the effects
of fiscal policy in a context in which the persistence of unemployment is endogenously
determined. The behavior of the government and the households are unchanged, but the
firms’ problem is modified accordingly. The setting is intentionally kept as sleek as possible
in order to closely tie it together with the analysis in the preceding section. Thus, although a
numerical solution methods is used I do not embark on a large-scale quantitative assessment
of the model properties. Instead, and following the main gist developed throughout this
paper, the purpose is to give an illustration of the main mechanisms at work, and show
that none of the past conclusions are artifacts of the, admittedly synthetic, imposed law of
motion for employment.
A few additional challenges arise. First, in order to provide a reasonable story of the evo-
lution of unemployment, the augmented model must encompass a frictional labor market
with potentially long-lasting employment relations. To this end, I consider firms which op-
erate within a Mortensen-Pissarides flavored framework (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994).
Second, and as a consequence of the dynamic nature of firm-recruitment, some questions
arise with respect to the future processes of labor productivity, nominal wages, and prices.
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To remain somewhat agnostic, I will assume that firms’ quasi-rents revert back to their
steady-state value in all periods beyond the second. This idea contrasts to studies such as
Hall (2005), which assumes a constant ratio between the process for nominal wages and
prices – i.e. real wages – but allow for random variations in the process for labor productiv-
ity. However, as a constant real wage induces quite substantial pro-cyclical movements in
quasi-rents, and ultimately in recruitment, I view the aforementioned assumption as rela-
tively prudent and likely to attenuate the effects of both ‘news’ and fiscal policy on current
economic activity.
Lastly, and as previously noted, a final difficulty arises as the framework does not admit
a closed-form solution. As a consequence, I will numerically evaluate the model predictions.
The computational details can be found in Appendix B.
As will become apparent, the main conclusions from the preceding analysis remain largely
unaffected, with slight but interesting modifications. Most notably, the fiscal multiplier
displays quite dramatic nonlinearities with respect to both the magnitude of the shock and
the size of the stimulus package. With an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of one-
third, the model predicts a fiscal multiplier which ranges from 0.3 to 1.5, depending on the
severity of the recession and the extent of government purchases.
4.1. Firms. A potential firm opens up a vacancy at cost k > 0. The cost k is thought to
represent an entrepreneur’s disamenity associated with the efforts of setting up a firm, and
not as a real, or monetary, cost per se. Conditional on posting a vacancy, a firm will instan-
taneously meet a worker with probability qt. With the complementary probability, however,
the vacancy is instead void and the vacancy-cost, k, is sunk. A successfully matched firm-
worker pair becomes immediately productive and produces zt units of the output good in
each period. The employment relation may last for perpetuity, but separations occur in each
period with probability λ. Entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk-neutral, hand-to-mouth
agents, and evaluate a successful employment relation in period t according to
Jt = Et
∞∑
s=0
(β(1 − λ))s
(
zt+s −
w˜t+s
pt+s
)
(22)
A utility maxmimizing entrepreneur will therefore post a vacancy in period t if and only if
the expected benefits, qtJt, (weakly) exceed the associated costs, k; qtJt ≥ k.
It ought to be noted that the preferences of entrepreneurs are divorced from those of the
households. In particular, while firms ultimately redistribute operation profits, or quasi-
rents, to the households, entrepreneurs do not internalize the associated welfare effects when
making the decision to enter the market. I relax this assumption in Appendix B.1 and show
that it is entirely innocuous from both a qualitative as well as quantitative perspective.
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4.2. Equilibrium. An employment-relation is formed in a frictional matching market.
With a slight abuse of notation, let vt denotes the measure of firms posting a vacancy
in period t. The measure of successful matches is then given by
Mt = M(vt, ut)
where ut represents the unemployment-rate in period t. The matching-function M(·) ex-
hibits constant returns to scale, and a firm posting a vacancy will therefore find a worker
with probability
qt =
Mt
vt
= q(θt), with θt =
vt
ut
(23)
As usual, θt denotes the labor market tightness in period t. Analogously, the job finding
probability of an unemployed worker in period t is given by
ft =
Mt
ut
= f(θt), with f(θt) = θtq(θt) (24)
As a consequence, employment evolves according to
nt = (nt−1λ+ (1− nt−1))ft + (1− λ)nt−1 (25)
The first term in brackets on the right-hand side represents the measure of joblessness in
the beginning of period t. Of these, a fraction, ft, will successfully find a job. The last term
represents the measure of non-separated workers from the preceding period. Obviously,
the measure of workers in period t must equal the measure of successful searchers, and the
measure of non-separated workers.
Definition 2. Given a process of wages, {w˜t}
∞
t=0, and a feasible process of policies, {Gt, Tt, dt+1}
∞
t=0,
a competitive equilibrium is a process of prices {pt, it+1}
∞
t=0 and quantities {ct, St+1, yt, θt, nt}
∞
t=0
such that for t = 0, 1, . . .
(i) Given prices and taxes, {ct, bt+1}
∞
t=0 solves the household’s problem (3), subject to
constraints (1) and (2).
(ii) Free entry ensures that k = qtJt, with Jt and qt defined in equations (22) and (23),
respectively.
(iii) The law of motion for employment satisfies equation (25), with n−1 given.
(iv) Markets clear. That is
m = ptyt + St+1
yt = ntzt
with St+1 ≥ 0, it+1 ≥ 0 and St+1 × it+1 = 0.
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Notice that the process of wages is taken as given. The reason is that once we leave the
realm of indeterminacy as discussed in Section 3, page 9, employment is always determined
for a sufficiently well-behaved problem under any wage-process. Yet, the equilibrium al-
locations will undoubtedly depend on the precise nature of this choice. While there is no
single compelling theory for wage determination in this framework (see Hall (2005) for a
discussion), the subsequent section will provide sufficient additional structure to determine
a unique equilibrium allocation.
4.3. Experiment. The experiment is virtually identical to that in Section 3.1, with minor
differences in terms of assumptions. In particular, the economy is initially at the steady
state equilibrium. In period zero agents unexpectedly receive news that labor productivity
in period one will equal δ. The main objective is then to analyze to which extent current
discretionary fiscal policy may alleviate the adverse effects brought on by the news of future
productivity.
As in the previous sections, I remain agnostic with respect to the evolution of events
beyond the first period. To accomplish this, it is again assumed that the economy is not in
a liquidity trap in period one, i.e. S2 = 0 (Assumption 1). However, and in contrast to the
preceding analysis, a firm’s decision to enter the market now depends on the entire perceived
path of future quasi-rents, zt+s−w˜t+s/pt+s, for s, t = 0, 1, . . . Thus, I will henceforth assume
that a firm’s continuation profits from period two onwards is equal to its steady-state value.
Assumption 4. Let w˜ and p denote the steady-state value of nominal wages and prices.
A firm’s expected net present value profits, Jt, is given by
J =
z − w˜/p
1− β(1− λ)
, for t = 2, 3, . . .
Combining Assumptions 1 and 4 infers that the future processes of productivity, news,
and nominal wages can, again, be left unspecified.
As I do not develop a theory of (re-)negotiations, nominal wages are assumed to be both
downwardly as well as upwardly rigid in periods zero and one.
Assumption 5. Let w˜ denote the steady-state value of nominal wages. Then,
w˜t = w˜, for t = 0, 1
It should be noted that much of the implications of Assumptions 4 and 5 are likely
to attenuate both the effects of news on economic activity, as well as the potency of fiscal
policy. To appreciate this, notice that as nominal wages are both upwardly and downwardly
rigid, a fall in output in period one translates to a fall in the contemporaneous real wage
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at an elasticity of unity.24 Thus, while negative news concerning future productivity may,
ceteris paribus, reduce firm profits, the associated fall in the real wage may well offset a large
share of the initial decline, and consequently abate the effect on real economic allocations.
Additionally, if shocks to labor productivity exhibit some degree of persistence, expected net
present value profits in periods two onwards are likely to fall well short of the steady-state
value J . As a consequence, Assumptions 4 and 5 may plausibly mitigate some of the effects
of news on firm profits, on entry, employment and, ultimately, on real economic activity.
Lastly, real government spending in any period other than zero is constant and equal to
Gt/pt = g¯ ≥ 0. In period zero, however, government purchases are, again, comprised by two
distinct parts; a non-discretionary component, G0/p0 = g¯, and a discretionary component,
g. The objective is, of course, to understand to which extent changes in real discretionary
spending, g, translates to changes in contemporaneous output, y0.
4.4. Calibration. The model is calibrated to target the US economy at a monthly fre-
quency. The matching function is given by
M(vt, ut) = vt(1− e
−
η
θt ) (26)
which exhibits constant returns to scale, with q(θ) and f(θ) ∈ (0, 1) for all θ ∈ R+ (Petron-
golo and Pissarides, 2001). The steady-state level of labor productivity, z, is normalized to
unity, and cash, m, is set equal to the steady-state employment rate, n. As a consequence,
the steady-state price level, p, equals one. Following Hall (2005), the nominal wage, w˜, is
set to 0.965.25 As I consider a monthly frequency, the discount factor, β, is set to 0.951/12,
and the separation rate, λ, to 0.034 (Hall, 2005; Shimer, 2005).
Under these parameter values, J is equal to 0.92. Given a labor market tightness of 0.45,
the parameter η in the matching function is set such that the steady-state unemployment
rate, u, equals five precent.26 Thus, the cost of posting a vacancy k is set to q(0.45)J . The
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is set to 1/3, and real non-discretionary government
spending equals 35 percent of steady-state output.27
The calibrated parameter values are summarized in Table 1, and the details of the com-
putational procedure is outlined in Appendix B.
24By Assumption 1 the real wage in period one is given by w˜/p = w˜y1/m, and the result follows.
25Under the current parameterization, a real wage of 0.965 corresponds to a 50/50 Nash-bargaining
solution at a flow-value of unemployment of 0.6. Using Hall’s (2005) flow-value of 0.4 infers a real wage of
0.95. The numerical results presented below are robust to such changes.
26A labor market tightness of 0.45 corresponds to the US average in the years 2001-2009 according to
JOLTS data.
27According to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database, a spending-to-output ratio of 0.35 corre-
sponds to the US average in 2000-2007.
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Table 1. Calibrated parameters and steady-state values
σ β η λ m w˜ k g¯/y z p u y θ
3 0.996 0.925 0.034 0.95 0.965 0.8 0.35 1 1 0.05 0.95 0.45
4.5. Results. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between anticipated changes in labor
productivity (‘news’) and the fiscal multiplier. Changes in labor productivity ranges from
an approximate decline of six percent, to a three percent increase.28 The associated unem-
ployment rate is provided in parenthesis.
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Figure 1. The fiscal multiplier with respect to news of future productivity.
Three quite stark characteristics emerges. First, the fiscal multiplier is zero whenever
the economy is not in a liquidity trap.29 This corroborates the conclusions drawn in the
preceding sections, and follows as government spending crowds-out private consumption
one-to-one. Second, the relationship between anticipated changes in productivity and the
28At a six percent decline in labor productivity the job finding rate is driven zero. Any further decline in
productivity infers that firms make negative operation profits even in ongoing employment relations. Under
such a scenario, either renegotiations are imminent, or there are endogenous layoffs. Both situations are
considered beyond the scope of this paper.
29The zero-lower bound on the interest rate is binding at a decline of future labor productivity of around
0.1 percent
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fiscal multiplier displays quite substantial nonlinearities. For instance, in a relatively mod-
est recession in which, say, the unemployment rate increases by two percentage points or
less, the fiscal multiplier is well below unity and government spending partly crowds-out
private consumption. Lastly, during more distressing times, the fiscal multiplier peaks –
and plateaus – at around 1.5. The consumption multiplier is, in contrast, equal to 0.5
and there is therefore no crowding-out. Thus, under this hypothesis even entirely wasteful
public spending unambiguously improve welfare.
What aspects of the economy are responsible for these predictions? Log-linearizing the
equation describing law of motion for employment in (25), yields
ln(nt+1/n) = α ln(nt/n)
with α = 1− f(θ)/n, and where n and θ refer to the steady-state values of employment and
labor market tightness, respectively. Inserting the parameter values provided in Section
4.4, reveals that α is approximately equal to 0.58.30 Thus, following the formula derived in
Proposition 4, we would expect to observe a multiplier of around 1.8. The peak value of 1.5
in Figure 1 is, I believe, remarkably consistent with this result. A trough of 0.3, however,
is not.
The reason behind this discrepancy is illustrated in Figure 2. The relationship marked AS
depicts the free entry condition k = q(θt)Jt, with θt expressed in terms of employment, nt
(which, in turn, is equal to output, yt). The two relationships marked AD illustrates on the
other hand the equation of exchange, m = py + S, with S satisfying the Euler equation at
different anticipated declines in labor productivity; a fall equal to one (AD) and five percent
(AD′), respectively. Clearly, in anticipation of a large fall in future labor productivity the
economy plunges into an equilibrium at a much flatter part of the aggregate supply curve.
As a consequence, government spending does little to raise prices, and does not crowd-out
private consumption by a noticeable amount. In contrast, at a relatively modest decline in
labor productivity, the equilibrium is left at a much steeper part of the aggregate supply
relation, and crowding-out is instead an imminent threat.31
4.5.1. Marginal vs. Average Multipliers. ‘The fiscal multiplier’ is commonly thought of as
the marginal change in contemporaneous output in response to a marginal increase in con-
temporaneous spending. While Figure 1 reveals that this relation may well depend on the
30As the estimated value of α in US data cannot be rejected to differ from unity, the model performs –
at least to a first approximation – quite poorly with respect to the persistence in unemployment.
31The kink which can be observed in the AD curve emerges quite naturally. At an off-equilibrium
unemployment rate of 7% or so, mean reversion is forceful, and the future does not appear very bleak in
comparison to the current situation. The economy is therefore not in a liquidity trap at this off-equilibrium
unemployment rate.
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Figure 2. Aggregate Demand and Supply.
severity of the recession, there are also reasons to believe that the size of the stimulus pack-
age itself may influence the effectiveness of government policy. Is the marginal multiplier
increasing or decreasing in the amplitude of discretionary spending? And, given a certain
amount of purchases, what is the size of the average multiplier?
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the extent of government spending and
the average as well as the marginal multiplier.32 The ‘extent’ of spending is quantified
as real government purchases in percent of output at the trough, evaluated at a recession
associated with an 8.2 percent unemployment rate. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the marginal
impact of fiscal policy is declining in the size of the stimulus package. And inasmuch as
the average is merely defined as the integral of the marginal, the average multiplier is
declining in the amplitude of spending as well, but always exceeds the marginal. Under the
hypothetical scenario depicted in Figure 3 it is apparent that a stimulus package of around
three percent of output is unambiguously welfare improving, leaving private consumption
entirely unaffected. The associated recovery closes approximately 80 percent of the output-
gap.
32Given a certain amount of government spending, g¯, the average multiplier is given by
∫ g¯
0
∂y
∂g
∣∣∣∣
g=gˆ
dgˆ
where ∂y/∂g|g=gˆ denotes the marginal multiplier evaluated at spending-level gˆ ≤ g¯.
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Figure 3. The fiscal multiplier with respect to news of future productivity.
However, while it might be reassuring to restrain government spending such that the
associated benefits, at the very least, are equal to the costs, such policy may be far from op-
timal. In particular the marginal benefits of government purchases unambiguously exceeds
the marginal costs at a level of spending which closes around 45 percent of the output gap,
or equivalently, around 1.2 percent of output.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied a model in which the effectiveness of fiscal policy increases
markedly in periods of low nominal interest rates and high, persistent, unemployment.
At the core of the analysis lies a novel intertemporal propagation mechanism in which the
labor market plays a pivotal role. With persistent unemployment, any increase in current
demand translates to an associated rise in future supply. But as rational economic actors
desire to smooth consumption over time, the increase in future supply feeds back to a further
rise in current demand.
These reinforcing mechanisms amplify the effectiveness of fiscal policy many times over.
An increase in government spending stimulates economic activity and lowers the unem-
ployment rate both in the present and in the future. But as a brighter future instills a
rise in private demand, unemployment falls even further and triggers an additional rise in
private demand, and so on. In a stylized framework in which the labor market exhibits
hysteresis, the fiscal multiplier is equal to the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal
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substitution, or simply the coefficient of relative risk aversion. In a more realistic setting,
the effect is somewhat dampened and displays significant nonlinearities with respect to the
output-gap. But in a severe recession with an unemployment rate exceeding the natural by
three percentage points or more, the marginal impact of government spending on output
equals 1.5.
However, the same mechanisms which may engender a large multiplier also infer some
restrictions on the conduct of efficient expansionary fiscal policy. Foremost, government
spending must create jobs. Real jobs. Letting idle workers dig a hole only to fill it up again is
not a viable option as it is unlikely to allow for a persistent decline in the unemployment rate.
Indeed, within the framework analyzed in this paper, a hole-digging policy is isomorphic to a
tax-financed tax-cut, which, from a representative agent’s perspective, is a wash. Spending
must therefore take the form of purchases of goods or services which would normally be
provided in the economy even in the absence of fiscal intervention.
Second, while the analysis in this paper is centered around a one-sector framework, it
is, to a certain extent, straightforward to extrapolate results to a more realistic setting:
Spending must target sectors which exhibits spare capacity. Outbidding potential buyers
at a Sotheby’s auction is likely to yield a multiplier of zero or less. But investing in in-
frastructure during a housing crisis may plausibly carry a much larger kickback. Perhaps
paradoxically then, while government purchases ought to be directed towards sectors where
private demand is temporarily slack, public goods must not substitute for private consump-
tion. If the private enjoyment of publicly purchased goods substitute for that of privately
purchased goods, the stimulative properties of government spending vanish.
But acknowledging the challenges to effective fiscal policies is not the same as dismissing
them as mere fairy tales. The main point of this paper still remains. At low levels of
nominal interest and high, persistent unemployment, accurately targeted fiscal policy may
be a potent tool in combatting a deep, demand-driven, recession.
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1. In the steady state, yt = z and ct = yt(1 − γ). As a consequence an
equilibrium allocation of prices and quantities must satisfy the following sequence of equations for all time-
periods t
β(1 + it+1)
pt
pt+1
= 1 (A1)
m− ptz ≥ 0 (A2)
it+1 ≥ 0 (A3)
(m− ptz)it+1 = 0 (A4)
Accompanied with equation (A1), the no-Ponzi conditions – equations (2) and (7) – imply
lim
n→∞
βn
St+n+1
pt+n
≥ 0
Combining with the transversality condition yields
lim
n→∞
βn
St+n+1
pt+n
= 0 (A5)
Let us first verify that pt = m/z and it+1 = 1/β − 1 is indeed a solution. Obviously pt = m/z and
(1+it+1)β = 1 satisfy equation (A1), as well as equation (A2) with equality. As a consequence, it+1 = 1/β−1
satisfies the inequality in equation (A3). Since, pt = m/z, equation (A4) follows. Since St+1 = m − ptzt,
the transversality condition in (A5) is satisfied with equality. Thus pt = m/z and it+1 = 1/β − 1 is indeed
a sequence of equilibrium prices.
Now suppose there exist some other equilibrium allocation with 0 ≤ pt < m/z for some t.33 Then by
equation (A4), it+1 = 0. By equation (A1), pt+1 = βpt, and thus it+2 = 0, and so on. As a consequence,
pt+n = β
npt. Inserting into the transversality condition reveals that
lim
n→∞
βn
St+n+1
pt+n
= lim
n→∞
βt
pt
(m− zβnpt) > 0
As a consequence, pt < m/z for some t cannot be an equilibrium. Thus there exist a unique steady-state
equilibrium with prices pt = m/z and it+1 = 1/β − 1.
With respect to the discussion in Section 3.1, on page 10, suppose that z0 = δ < z. It is trivial to show
that p0 = m/δ, and i1 > 0 such that
u′(δ)
u′(z)
×
δ
z
= β(1 + i1) > 1
with pt and it+1 as previously for t ≥ 1, satisfies the above (appropriately modified) equilibrium conditions,
with S1 = 0. Again, if p0 < m/δ, we have that
pt+1 = β
u′(z)
u′(δ)
pt < β
u′(z)
u′(δ)
m
δ
<
m
z
where the last inequality follows from
u′(z)
u′(δ)
×
z
δ
< 1
33Notice that pt > m/z would imply that St+1 < 0 which is an impossibility.
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A.2. Proof of Proposition 2. First, notice that y0 > z is not a possible equilibrium as it would violate the
time-endowment of unity. As a consequence, y0 ≤ z. Suppose that the inequality is strict. The aggregate
budget constraint, m = p0y0 + S1, then infers that either p0 > m/z, or S1 > 0 (or both). Under this
hypothesis there is involuntary unemployment and wages must fall until p0 = m/z. The Euler equation is
therefore given by
u′(y0) =
β
z
δh(y0/z)u
′(δh(y0/z))
Using the parametric forms u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ
and h(n) = nα reveals that there are two solutions associated with
the above equation
y0 = z
(
δ
δ∗
) 1−σ
σ−α(σ−1)
or y0 = 0
In the first case, y0 must (weakly) exceed z as, δ ≥ δ
∗, and 1−σ
σ−α(σ−1)
> 0. This is a contradiction. In the
second case, y0 = 0 indeed solves the Euler equation, but the not the households’ optimization problem: If
y0 = 0, a representative household allocates all her nominal resources towards period one, in which prices
are infinite, and resources useless. Given such prices, the household would be better off by spending some
initial nominal resources in period zero, ruling out y0 = 0 as a possible equilibrium.
It remains to be verified that y0 = z is indeed an equilibrium. Due to downward nominal wage rigidity
p0 ≥ m/z. Thus, according to the aggregate budget constraint together with the condition St+1 ≥ 0, it
follows that p0 = m/z and S1 = 0. As a consequence, there exist a unique i1 ≥ 0 such that
u′(z) = β(1 + i1)
δ
z
u′(δ)
Lastly, consider the effect of fiscal policy. For any g > 0, there exist a i1 > 0 such that
u′(z(1− γ)− g) = β(1 + i1)
δ
z
u′(δ(1− γ))
As a consequence, there is full crowding-out and the multiplier is zero.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3. First, suppose that y0 = z. Then using the arguments in the proof of
Proposition 2 it is immediate that p0 = m/z and that S1 = 0. However, as δ < δ
∗, the interest-rate which
satisfies
u′(z) = β(1 + i1)
δ
z
u′(δ)
must be negative, which violates the zero lower bound. As a consequence, y0 < z, p0 = m/z, S1 > 0 and
i0 = 0. The Euler equation is thus given by
u′(y) =
β
z
δh(y/z)u′(δh(y/z))
Using the aforementioned parametric forms we have
y0 = z
(
δ
δ∗
) 1−σ
σ−α(σ−1)
or y0 = 0
Again, y0 = 0 can be ruled out by repeating the previous arguments.
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A.4. Proof of Proposition 4. The Euler equation is then given by
u′(y0 − g0 − g) =
β
z
δh(y0/z)u
′(δh(y0/z) − g1)
Applying the implicit function theorem evaluated at gt = γyt, t = 0, 1, and g = 0 yields
∂y0
∂g
= −
u′′(y0(1− γ))
β
z
δh′(y0/z)
1
z
u′(δh(y0/z)(1− γ)) +
β
z
δh(y0/z)u′′(δh(y0/z)(1− γ))δh′(y0/z)
1
z
− u′′(y0(1− γ))
Using the Euler equation together with the following relations
yu′′(y(1− γ))
u′(y(1− γ))
=
σ
1− γ
= σˆ and h′(y/z)
y
zh(y/z)
= α
leaves us with
∂y0
∂g
= −
u′′(y0(1− γ))
α
y0
u′(y0(1− γ))− σˆ
α
y0
u′(y0(1− γ)) + σˆ
α
y0
u′(y0(1− γ))
=
1
1− α
(
1− 1
σˆ
)
Appendix B. Computational Details
In period t = 1 the equilibrium is described by the following equations
k = q(θ1)
(
δ −
w˜
p1
+ β(1− λ)J
)
n1 = (n0λ+ (1− n0))h(θ1) + n0(1− λ)
y1 = δn1
p1 =
m
y1
where the three first equations can be combined to yield the aggregate supply relation, and the last equation
describes aggregate demand.
I solve the above equations for the unknowns θ1, n1, y1, and p1 using a nonlinear equation solver for each
value of n0 on a grid containing 1000 equidistant nodes between 0.9 and 0.95. Using linear interpolation,
this yields policy functions p1(n0, δ), y1(n0, δ), J1(n0, δ) and c1(n0, δ).
In period zero, the equilibrium is given by the following system of equations
k = q(θ0)
(
δ −
w˜
p0
+ β(1− λ)J1(n0, δ)
)
(A6)
n0 = (n−1λ+ (1− n−1))h(θ0) + n−1(1− λ) (A7)
y0 = n0 (A8)
m = p0y0 + S1 (A9)
u′(
m− Sˆ1
p0
− g¯ − g) = β
p0
p1(n0, δ)
u′(c1(n0, δ)) (A10)
with S1 = max{Sˆ1, 0}. Given, n−1 = n, this yields policy functions p0(δ, g), and y0(δ, g). For a certain value
of δ, the fiscal multiplier is calculated as
∂y0
∂g
=
y0(δ, ε)− y0(δ, 0)
ε
with ε = 1e(−8).
To generate Figure 1, I calculate the fiscal multiplier for each value of δ on a grid containing 1000
equidistant nodes between 0.9 and 1.03.
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In contrast, to generate Figure 3, I set δ at a fixed value of 0.941 and solve system (A6)-(A10) for each
value of g on a grid containing 1000 equidistant nodes between 0 and 0.05. Let j denote an arbitrary node
in the grid. The average multiplier is then calculated as∑j
s=1(y0(δ, gs)− y0(δ, gs−1))
gj
The output gap is given by
(ln 0.95 − ln y0(δ, gj))× 100
Lastly, to generate Figure 2, I construct a grid of labor market tightness, θ0, containing 1000 equidistant
nodes between zero and one. Implicitly, this defines a grid of output ranging from approximately 0.9177 to
0.9674. Given δ = 0.99, I then solve equations (A6)-(A8) for “supply prices”, and plot these together with
the grid for output to generate the AS curve. In a similar way, I solve equations (A9)-(A10) for “demand
prices” to generate the AD curve. Then I set δ = 0.95 and recompute equations (A9)-(A10) to generated
the AD′ curve.34
B.1. Alternative discounting. Following equation (22) firms evaluate a successful match according to
Jt = Et
∞∑
s=0
(β(1− λ))s
(
zt+s −
w˜t+s
pt+s
)
Thus, as firms discount future profits by β, entrepreneurs do not internalize their entry-decision on household
welfare.
Consider the alternative. The marginal effect of an additional vacancy yields nominal profits in period t
equal to pt× (zt− w˜t/pt). As these profits are first disposable to the household in period t+1, the marginal
gain is therefore
(zt −
w˜t
pt
)βu′(ct+1)
pt
pt+1
As a consequence, a firm which internalizes the decision to entry on the representative household’s welfare
evaluates a successful match according to
Jt = Et
∞∑
s=0
(β(1− λ))sβu′(ct+s+1)
pt+s
pt+s+1
(
zt+s −
w˜t+s
pt+s
)
Let us rewrite the vacancy-posting cost k as k = k˜βu′(c), where c denotes the steady-state level of consump-
tion. The free-entry condition is then given by
k˜ = qtEt
∞∑
s=0
(β(1− λ))s
u′(ct+s+1)
u′(c)
pt+s
pt+s+1
(
zt+s −
w˜t+s
pt+s
)
Thus by Assumption 4 and 5, the free-entry condition in period one is given by
k˜ = q1
[
E1
u′(c2)
u′(c)
p1
p2
(
δ −
w˜
p1
)
+ β(1− λ)J
]
The model does not have enough structure to pin down the value of neither c2 nor p2. For simplicity, I will
assume that they equal their steady-state values. Under these conditions period-one free-entry infers
k˜ = q1
[
p1
(
δ −
w˜
p1
)
+ β(1− λ)J
]
= q1J1
34The AS relation changes unnoticeably between setting δ equal to 0.99 or 0.95. As a consequence, I only
plot the former.
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And the equivalent condition in period zero is given by
k˜ = q0
[
u′(c1)
u′(c)
p0
p1
(
z −
w˜
p1
)
+ β(1− λ)J1
]
= q0J0
with k˜ calibrated to the same value as k.35
Figure 4 reproduces Figure 1 using the free-entry conditions above (grey curve), and the free-entry
condition associated with equation (22) (black curve). Clearly, the numerical results are robust to alternative
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Figure 4. The fiscal multiplier with respect to news of future productivity.
discounting procedures.
35Notice that if k˜ takes on the same value as k, the steady-state targets discussed in Section 4.4 are
satisfied.
